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Abstract: This paper focuses on the differences between Article 82 and Section 2, 
reflecting largely on the American experience. We start with a discussion of the 
American experience and use that as a background from which to examine the European 
law on monopolies.  American law is more conservative (less interventionist), reflecting 
the error cost analysis that is increasingly common in American courts.  The second half 
of this paper provides an empirical comparison of the American and European regimes.  
Although a preliminary empirical examination suggests that the scope of a country’s 
monopolization law is inversely related to its degree of trade dependence, the actual 
relationship between trade dependence and the scope of monopolization law appears to 
be an inverted U. 
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Although there are more than 100 competition law regimes around the world, the United 
States and the European Union are by far the most important.  Both systems have laws 
constraining the conduct of monopoly firms.  In the U.S. this part of competition law is 
called monopolization law, while in the EU it is called dominance law.  We will use the 
terms interchangeably below.  This paper will survey the doctrinal differences and 
empirically examine the determinants of monopolization law in the U.S. and EU. 
 
In the U.S., the law governing monopolies is provided by Section 2 of the Sherman Act 
and the judicial opinions interpreting it.1  In the EU, monopolization law is provided by 
Article 82 of the European Community Treaty and related case law.2  Sherman Act 
Section 2 says that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any person or persons, to monopolize any part of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony.”3  Article 82 says that “[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between member 
States.”4  It then provides several examples of types of abuse.5 
 
These provisions are both invitations to their respective courts to develop a common law 
of competition governing dominant firms.  In this respect, the American experience is 
illuminating because it began much earlier than the European effort.  The Sherman Act 
was enacted in 1890, giving us more than 100 years of case law interpreting it.  The case 
law interpreting Article 82 goes back to the early 1970s.6 
 
This paper focuses on the broad differences between Article 82 and Section 2, reflecting 
largely on the American experience.7  We start with a discussion of the American 
experience and use that as a background from which to examine the European law on 
                                                 
1 For an overview and discussion of statute and case law on monopolization, see PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 368-342 (6th ed. 2004). 
2 For an overview, see FAULL & NIKPAY: THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION (Jonathan Faull & Ali Nikpay 
eds., 1999). 
3 The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §2 (2000). 
4 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 65 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty]. 
5 EC Treaty art. 82 provides, 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d)  making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the 
subject of such contracts. 
6 FAULL & NIKPAY, supra note 2, at 117-203. 
7 For a recent comparison focusing on general enforcement issues, see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing 
Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and Europe, 1 J. Comp. Law & Economics 427 (2005). 
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monopolies.  In general, American law is more conservative (less interventionist) – 
reflecting the error-cost analysis that is increasingly common in American courts. 
 
Although a preliminary empirical examination suggests that the scope of a country’s 
monopolization law is inversely related to its degree of trade dependence,8 the actual 
relationship between trade dependence and the scope of monopolization law appears to 
be an inverted U.  As import penetration rises from an initial base level, dominance law 
increases in scope and then reaches a point where it declines.  This is consistent with the 
theory that domestic firms seek legal protection from competition until a point is reached 
at which the benefits from additional protection no longer exceed the costs of obtaining 
it.   
 
The empirical evidence also has implications for the comparison between the U.S. and 
EU.  Any such comparison should control for factors that determine the scope of 
monopolization law.  In comparison to the European countries that were members of the 
EU before 2004, monopolization law in the U.S. does not appear to be narrower in scope 
when one controls for the economic and demographic factors that influence it.  However, 
in comparison to the post-2004 enlarged EU, U.S. monopolization law is narrower in 
scope.  Monopolization law is narrower in EU countries with a socialist background.  The 
scope is broader in EU countries with a Scandinavian legal background. 
 
The empirical analysis is for the most part a search for the contemporary determinants of 
monopolization law, and an inconclusive one at that.  The factors that one would expect 
to be important – wealth, international trade, sectoral composition, size of government – 
all turn out to be so, but in complicated ways.  Wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, is 
by far the most important factor influencing the scope of monopolization law in the U.S. 
and EU. 
 
II. Monopolization Law in the U.S. and the EU 
 
A. Section 2 Law 
 
Almost every statute is an invitation to courts to develop a common law based on it.9  
That is because the text of a statute is hardly ever sufficient to resolve all disputes 
concerning its meaning.  Disputes over interpretation inevitably arise and those disputes 
wind up in court.  Judges are called on to fill in the interpretive gaps of the statute. 
                                                 
8 On the relationship between imports and monopolization law, see Table 1, infra.  Andrew Guzman has 
offered one theory of the relationship between trade and competition law, see Andrew T. Guzman, The 
Case for International Antitrust, in Competition Laws in Conflict, Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global 
Economy 99, 101 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,2004).  Guzman’s thesis is that net 
importer states (trade dependent states) will tend to have strict antitrust laws because those laws will apply 
to foreign firms operating in their markets.  States that are net exporters will tend to have less strict antitrust 
laws because they will not want to hamper the competitive efforts of their dominant firms.  He suggests that 
this is externalizing the costs of anticompetitive conduct to foreign consumers. 
9 This brief overview of Section 2 borrows heavily from Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of 




However, even if we accept the observation that statutes are invitations to develop 
common law, Section 2 of the Sherman Act is an unusually broad invitation.10  The 
federal legislature in 1890 invited courts to develop a common law of monopolization.  
What existed before then as English common law on monopolization was scant and 
unlikely to be of much use to courts in interpreting the Sherman Act.11 
 
The American judges took a conservative approach initially.12  With virtually no case law 
other than that based on Section 1 to draw on for guidance, they stayed close to familiar 
precedents, extending the reach of Section 2 only to conduct that seemed most clearly to 
violate it in light of earlier decisions.13  The most comprehensive early effort to interpret 
Section 2 is the Standard Oil decision of 1911.14  
 
Although Areeda described it as “remarkable for its cloudy prolixity,”15 Standard Oil 
delivered some important lessons about the early understanding of Section 2.16  It adopts 
the “abuse standard” of monopolization,17 under which a firm can be found guilty of 
violating Section 2 if it engages in conduct that would violate Section 1 if engaged in by 
a combination of firms.  The abuse standard requires a finding of specific intent to 
monopolize.18  Specific intent to monopolize, in turn, is inferred by conduct that cannot 
be justified on the basis of legitimate competitive goals, conduct that can be understood 
only as an effort to destroy competition from rivals.  The early opinions suggest that it is 
an objective inquiry based on facts.19 
 
The early cases also established that monopoly status is not unlawful.20  The statute was 
interpreted to prohibit efforts to monopolize, for example by destroying competitors.  
However, the statute was not interpreted to prohibit the mere setting of the monopoly 
price.  This part of the early understanding of Section 2 remains valid law in America 
today. 
 
                                                 
10 Hylton, supra note 9, at 83. 
11 Some scholars have questioned the existence of a pre-Sherman Act common law of monopolization, see 
WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN 
ANTITRUST ACT 19 (1965). 
12 Hylton, supra note 9 at 84. 
13 See, e.g., KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 186-
188 (2003) (discussing early Section 2 case law). 
14 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); 
15 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 148 (3d ed. 1981).  
16 Hylton, supra note 9 at 84. 
17 E.g., HYLTON, supra note 13, 187 
18 Id.  This is also clear from perusing the early opinions.  See, e.g., AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, 369-372 
(providing excerpts from Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58, 61, 67, 75, and United States v. American Tobacco 
Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-183 (1911), stating that the defendant was found guilty of violating  Section 2 
because its conduct indicated an intent to monopolize by excluding or destroying rivals). 
19 See, e.g., Areeda et al., supra note 1, 369-372 (excerpts from Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61, 62, 75 and 
American  Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 181-183). 
20 See e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 62 (“[T]he statute…by the omission of any direct prohibition against 
monopoly in the concrete…indicates a consciousness that the freedom of the individual right to 
contract…was the most efficient means for the prevention of monopoly”) (emphasis added). 
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The conservative approach to Section 2 reflected in Standard Oil was not without 
controversy.21  Proponents of strong antitrust enforcement wanted a more aggressive 
interpretation and found their position vindicated, in their eyes, by the government’s loss 
in the United States Steel case of 1920.22  On the other hand, the conservative approach 
discouraged judges from attempting to design and implement their own welfare tests of 
dominant firm conduct.  The specific intent test originally adopted asked courts to 
determine whether there were plausible efficiency or competitive bases for the 
defendant’s conduct.  If so, the specific intent test implied that the defendant should not 
be found guilty of violating Section 2. 
 
The conservative approach was brought to an end in 1945 with Judge Learned Hand’s 
decision in Alcoa.23  Although Alcoa is a marvel in clarity in comparison to Standard Oil, 
its statement of the new monopolization standard seems to invite alternative 
interpretations.24  Still, one point is clear: the specific intent test is no longer required 
under Section 2.25  Beyond that unambiguous point, Judge Hand’s decision suggests that, 
as a general rule, violations of Section 2 will be determined by a balancing of the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct.  Under the Alcoa 
test, the defendant may have a substantial efficiency justification for its conduct, yet it 
may still be found in violation of Section 2 because the anticompetitive effects were 
deemed too severe by the court. 
 
As a summary of American monopoly law, Judge Hand’s statement of it in Alcoa 
remains valid.26  Courts continue to refer to it as a starting point in discussions of the 
monopolization test.27  But a more detailed look reveals that the standard for 
monopolization has been altered in practice since Alcoa, and largely in a direction that 
favors dominant firm defendants.  The date at which the change in Section 2 law began 
appears to be 1975, with the publication of the Areeda and Turner article on predatory 
pricing.28  Areeda and Turner noted the uncertainty surrounding predation charges and 
the costs of error, and proposed a cost-based test to screen out predation claims with high 
error costs.  Following their article, courts began to adopt their cost-based screen and to 
take seriously the costs of false convictions. 
 
                                                 
21 Hylton, supra note 9 at 85. 
22 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). 
23 United States v. Alum. Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter Alcoa]. 
24 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal 
Standards and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617 (1999) (interpreting Alcoa as a “no fault” or strict 
liability standard), versus Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, 
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1999) (interpreting Alcoa as a balancing test). 
25 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432 (“no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing”). 
26 Hylton, supra note 9 at 86.  
27 See, e.g., F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagram S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004); Eastman Kodak Co. 
v. Image Tech. Svces., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 
U.S. 585 (1985); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
952 (2001).  
28 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975). 
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The changes in Section 2 case law have not occurred across the board, but in specific 
pockets.29  One pocket is predatory pricing.  The Matsushita30 and Brooke Group31 cases 
require, in order to hold a firm guilty of predatory pricing under Section 2, a price below 
some measure of cost (average variable cost usually) and objective evidence that the 
defendant is likely to recoup the losses incurred in the predatory (low-price) period.32  
The Brooke Group test is equivalent to a specific intent test.33  The reason is that if the 
requirements of the Brooke Group test are satisfied, then one can conclude that the 
objective evidence implies that the defendant’s intent was predatory. 
 
The type of monopolization test, or how it is framed, may not be important in the end.  
Whether the monopolization test is framed, as in the pre-1945 period, in terms of specific 
intent, or, as in the post-1945 period, as a welfare balancing test, the underlying question 
is the evidentiary burden placed on plaintiffs in a monopolization case.  In general, the 
specific intent test, as historically applied, puts the greatest evidentiary burden on the 
plaintiff.  The consumer welfare test places a much lighter burden on the plaintiff.  But if 
the consumer welfare test were coupled with several additional evidentiary burdens – 
e.g., standards requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence – it could present 
roughly the same obstacles to plaintiffs as the specific intent test.  The issue at bottom is 
one of evidentiary burden.34 
 
Another pocket of Section 2 case law in which courts have drifted back to the specific 
intent formulation is that involving “essential facilities”.35  The decision in Aspen,36 
which suggested that the defendant lost solely because it failed to provide a credible 
competitive justification for its conduct, carried the implication that the mere provision of 
such a justification would immunize a defendant from liability in an essential facilities 
case.  That implication was apparently confirmed with Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Trinko.37 
                                                 
29 Hylton, supra note 9 at 86. 
30 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
31 Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (evidence of 
below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of probable recoupment and injury to 
competition). 
32 Id. at 240-242; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595-598. 
33 Salop & Romaine, supra note 22, at 17, 24, 35; Cass & Hylton, supra note 21, at 639, 671. 
34 Id.  
35 See generally Philip E. Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 
ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and  Essential Facilities, 1991 Brigham 
Young Univ. L. Rev. 1243; Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1187 (1999); Glen O. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177 (2002). 
36 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). 
37 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of V. Trinko, LLP., 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  Scalia’s opinion, 
expressing skepticism toward the essential facilities doctrine, described Aspen as a case “at or near the 
outer boundary of Section 2 liability.”  Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.  Scalia described the defendant’s conduct 
in Aspen as refusing, without a competitive justification, to supply a product at retail price to one’s 
competitor, Id., at 408-409, which suggested an intent to harm.  The defendant in Trinko failed to provide a 
pro-competitive justification for its actions.  However, the Court refused to find an antitrust violation based 
solely on the defendant’s failure to accept a statutory burden to support rivals.  Thus, Trinko implicitly 
holds that a sufficient justification for denying access to an essential facility is the desire to avoid providing 
a benefit to a rival.  If that is a sufficient justification for denying liability, then it follows that a plaintiff, in 
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The most important non-Supreme Court Section 2 case of recent history, Microsoft,38 
suggests a broader shift toward the specific intent formulation.  The D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion initially states the monopolization test as a consumer welfare balancing test.39  
Then, when it gets around to actually applying the test to Microsoft’s conduct, it moves 
into a specific intent analysis.  The court repeatedly condemns Microsoft’s conduct 
because it appeared, to the court, to have no credible pro-efficiency or competitive 
rationale.40  As an illustration of the inability of verbal formulations to tightly constrain 
the decision making of courts, the D.C. Circuit’s application of the specific intent test put 
so little weight on Microsoft’s justifications that it was arguably equivalent to a balancing 
test conducted with a pro-plaintiff bias.  For example, in examining the complaints 
concerning Microsoft’s integration of Internet Explorer with its Windows operating 
system, the court found that two of the three complaints (excluding Internet Explorer 
from the Add/Remove Programs function and commingling browser and operating 
system code) were violations of the Sherman Act, because Microsoft offered no credible 
procompetitive justification, while one (overriding the choice of an alternative default 
browser in certain circumstances) was not a violation because Microsoft’s justification 
was sufficient.41  Yet it seems that the technical justifications offered by Microsoft, and 
accepted by the court, in response to the complaint that was rejected should apply just as 
well to the other two complaints.42 
 
American courts have been conservative in interpreting Section 2, in the sense of 
showing reluctance to penalize a firm simply because of its monopoly status and of 
allowing wide scope, at least at the level of pure legal doctrine, for efficiency defenses to 
be asserted.43   Of the 120 years that the Sherman Act has been in effect, courts applied a 
specific intent test under Section 2 for 55 of those years – from 1890 to 1945.  Alcoa 
introduced a balancing test in 1945 and scrapped the specific intent test.  However, since 
roughly 1975 we have seen the reemergence of versions of the specific intent approach. 
 
B. Judging Article 82 in light of the American experience 
 
Viewed in light of the American experience, Article 82 reflects a more interventionist 
approach toward antitrust law.  The best illustration of this is the fact that Article 82 has 
been interpreted to make unlawful, as a form of monopoly abuse, the charging of a 
monopoly price.  The first general application provided in the text of Article 82, referring 
                                                                                                                                                 
order to prevail in an essential facilities case, has to present evidence indicating that the defendant had an 
intent to harm its rival.  
38 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 34. 
39 Id. at 58. 
40 Id. at 72, 74, 76, 77.  
41 Id. at 66-67. 
42 If Internet Explorer should be allowed to override an alternative browser in order to allow the user to get 
to Microsoft’s “HELP” site, then it would seem to follow that the company would want to prevent the user 
from removing Internet Explorer from the list of programs integrated into the operating system. 
43 See Hylton, supra note 9 at 86. 
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to a type of abuse that violates the treaty provision is “directly or indirectly imposing 
unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;…”44 
 
1. America versus Europe: Some Examples 
 
American antitrust courts decided early on not to regulate pricing under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  In the first case interpreting the Sherman Act to reach the Supreme Court, 
U.S. v. Trans-Missouri,45 the Court majority argued against adopting a reasonableness 
test on the ground that the court would be required by such a test to determine the 
reasonableness of prices.  The Court viewed this as beyond the capacity of judges.46 
 
As an argument against using some notion of reasonableness in interpreting the Sherman 
Act, Trans-Missouri is unpersuasive.  Pre-Sherman Act common law decisions on 
contracts in restraint of trade employed the reasonableness test without being led into an 
examination of the reasonableness of prices or profits.47  The reasonableness test applies 
to the defendant firm’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct, not to the prices or profits that 
result from that conduct. 
 
However, as an argument against using law to establish appropriate guidelines for price 
or profit levels, Trans-Missouri’s argument is no less valid today than it was 100 years 
ago.  American courts have consistently rejected the notion that the Sherman Act calls on 
judges to take on the functions of regulatory commissions with power over pricing 
decisions.48 
 
Predation is another good illustration of the sizeable differences between European and 
American courts in applying monopolization law.   The Matsushita and Brooke Group 
cases in America require from the plaintiff, in order to survive a summary judgment 
motion, proof that the dominant firm priced below average variable cost and that the firm 
was likely to recoup its losses from pricing below cost.  In contrast, the European Court 
of Justice, in cases such as AKZO and Tetra Pak II, has held that pricing below average 
variable cost violates the law against predation, and prices below average cost also 
violate the law although the defendant can rebut the presumption of a violation.49  
Moreover, there is no requirement on the part of the plaintiff to prove a high likelihood of 
recoupment.50 
 
                                                 
44 EC Treaty art. 82. 
45 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
46 Id. at 331. 
47 HYLTON, supra note 13, at 33-34. 
48 See, e.g., Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415 (“No court should impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or 
adequately and reasonably supervise.” (quoting Areeda, supra note 34, at 853)); United States v. United 
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass. 1953) (refusing to order the defendant’s 
dissolution), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
49 See, e.g., Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359; Case T-83/91 Tetra 
Pak Int’l SA v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. II-755, 4 C.M.L.R. 726 (1997), aff’d C-333/94, 1996 E.C.R. I-
5951, 4 C.M.L.R. 662 (1997). 
50 See, e.g., Vickers, supra note 38, at F248. 
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The “essential facilities” doctrine is a third illustration of the formal differences between 
European and American monopolization law.  Trinko implies that the set of cases in 
which the essential facilities doctrine will be used by a court to force a dominant firm to 
share access to some input with a competitor is quite narrow.  The Court’s discussion in 
Trinko suggests that strong evidence of intent to monopolize is required.  In contrast, the 
European Court of Justice has been considerably more receptive to the essential facilities 
doctrine and has not attempted to limit its application to a narrow set of circumstances.51 
 
Microsoft v. Commission52 provides an example of the difference between the US and EU 
on the essential facilities question.  The European Court of First Instance found that 
Microsoft abused its dominant position by refusing to license, at a sufficiently low price, 
interoperability information to rivals in the market for server software.  The Court of First 
Instance deferred to the European Commission’s analysis of the effects of Microsoft’s 
refusal, but did not independently examine the record for evidence of a specific intent to 
monopolize. 
 
2. Predation and Error Costs 
 
It is commonplace by now to note that the differences between European and American 
law on predatory pricing reflect different views on the costs of error.  The American 
approach puts a great deal of weight on the costs of false convictions.  Erroneously 
holding firms liable for setting prices too low penalizes dominant firms for competing 
vigorously.  This discourages competition, a result opposite to that intended by the 
Sherman Act.  The European approach puts more emphasis on the costs of false 
acquittals.  If false acquittal costs are constrained over time by competition, as 
Easterbrook argued,53 the American approach would result in superior law. 
 
One could stop at the observation that the wisdom of the American approach depends on 
the balance of error costs.  This would be a convenient and diplomatic statement because 
no one has carried out an empirical study of the balance of error costs in predatory 
pricing cases.  Hence, noting that the relative wisdom of the two approaches depends on 
the balance of error costs leaves us with an invitation to do empirical research and 
perhaps not much more.  Moreover, the prospect of answering the welfare question on the 
basis of empirical research seems slim, because it is hard to isolate the effects of different 
predation laws on consumer welfare. 
 
An alternative and less diplomatic perspective is the decision-theoretic approach set out 
in the Hylton and Salinger article, and in the Evans and Padilla article.54  Let the fraction 
                                                 
51 See Damien Geradin, Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the EC Treaty: What can the EU Learn from 
the US Supreme Court's Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS, and Deutsche Telekom, at 5-6, 
Common Market Law Review, December 2005, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=617263. 
52 Case T-201/04, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79929082T19040201&doc=T&ouvert=T&seance=ARRET  
53 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1984). 
54 See generally Keith N. Hylton & Michael A. Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic 
Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001); David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Antitrust: Designing 
Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005).  
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of competitive price cuts be given by P(C).  Let the fraction of anticompetitive (i.e., 
predatory) price cuts be given by P(A).  Let the likelihood that a competitive price cut is 
ruled anticompetitive be given by P(A′|C), and P(A′|A) the rate of correct decisions given 
anticompetitive conduct.  Bayes’ rule tells us that the fraction of competitive instances 
within the sample of decisions in which the competition authority has deemed the price 









  . 
 
Let us suppose that the vast majority of price cuts are procompetitive, say 95 percent.  
Suppose that the competition authority makes mistakes in only 5 percent of all cases.  It 
follows that the likelihood that a case that has been deemed anticompetitive by the 
competition authority is really competitive is ½.  In other words, half of the cases in 
which the court finds the conduct anticompetitive were instances in which the conduct 
really was competitive. 
 
The decision-theoretic approach focuses on the background rate of competitive instances 
within a certain class of conduct and on the rate at which competition authorities are 
likely to err in evaluating the conduct.  If we take price cuts as a class of conduct, we are 
likely to find that the vast majority of them are procompetitive.  Moreover, a competition 
authority is likely to have difficulty, ex post, in distinguishing competitive and 
anticompetitive price cuts.  Suppose, for example, that instead of the 5 percent error rate 
assumed in the previous example, competition authorities make mistakes in 20 percent of 
predatory pricing cases.  Using the Bayes’ rule approach just described, the rate of false 
positives jumps from 50 percent to 83 percent.  Moreover, holding error rates fixed and 
letting the proportion of competitive price cuts rise toward 100 percent causes the rate of 
false convictions to approach 100 percent. 
 
One might argue that this discussion merely shows that when the law is working, in the 
sense of inducing actors to comply with it, there will be a high rate of false convictions.55  
However, the message here is different.  It is quite plausible in the pricing context to 
presume that the vast majority of price cuts would be procompetitive even in the absence 
of antitrust law.  Competition already provides a substantial if not sufficient spur for 
firms to engage in price cutting.  Given this, it is not the law that gives us the 95 percent 
background rate of competitive price cuts, it is competition. If competition gives us a 
high rate of competitive price cuts, then we need to worry about the effects of a high rate 
of false convictions on the incentives already put into place by competition. 
 
In other words, the competitive price cut example in antitrust should be distinguished 
from that of compliance with tort law rules.  In the tort law setting, there are not, as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
For more recent decision-theory arguments, see also James C. Cooper, Luke M. Froeb, Dan O’Brien, 
Michael G. Vita, Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 Intn’l J. Industrial Organization 
639 (2005). 
55 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric Information Model of Litigation, 22 Int. Rev. Law Econ. 153-
75 (2003). 
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general rule, substantial private-interest motivations that would lead one to take costly 
precautions in order to avoid harming others.  A person who drives does not, in the 
typical case, have strong private-interest motivations to take care to avoid harming 
strangers.  When we see a high rate of compliance with the law in the torts context, that is 
quite likely due to the threat of liability.  A high rate of false convictions may simply be a 
reflection that the law is working as intended.  In the antitrust setting, in contrast, 
competition already provides a substantial private-interest motivation for firms to make 
price cuts.  A high rate of false convictions, then, is not necessarily a sign that the law is 
compelling firms to comply with its provisions.  Given this, there is a much greater 
likelihood in the antitrust than in the torts setting that the law distorts unilateral conduct 
away from the socially preferable. 
 
This argument is clearly capable of being generalized from the predatory pricing 
example.  In general, when the law imposes penalties on conduct that is typically 
procompetitive, there is a high risk of false convictions that both discourage 
procompetitive conduct and encourage wasteful litigation.  Legal and evidentiary 
standards should be adjusted to take these costs into account.  The evolution of American 
predatory pricing law toward the Brooke Group standard reflects precisely this sort of 
adjustment. 
 
III. An Empirical Approach 
 
A. Measuring Dominance Law 
 
Aside from the decision theoretic critique briefly recounted here, the only other basis for 
telling whether the American or European approach to monopolization law is superior is 
an empirical examination.  Since the European approach is more interventionist, the 
proper question is whether it leads to superior economic results.  This would be a difficult 
project.56  Economic outcomes are determined by many factors in addition to 
monopolization law. 
 
An alternative empirical question is to ask what factors seem to explain the variation in 
monopolization laws within the EC countries and between the United States and the EC.  
The chart below (Table 1) shows a Dominance Law Score (for the year 2003) for the 
United States and countries that were members of the European Community before 2004.  
The Dominance Law Score reflects the number of different practices explicitly mentioned 
in the nation’s laws governing the conduct of dominant firms. 
 
The Dominance Law Score was tabulated as follows.  Each country is given a score of 1 
if the part of its competition statute covering dominance (monopolization) prohibits one 
of the following practices: (1) limiting access (restricting supply), (2) abusive acts, (3) 
price setting, (4) discriminatory pricing, (5) resale price maintenance, (6) blocking entry, 
(7) predatory pricing.  Thus, 7 is the maximum Dominance Law Score possible, and 0 is 
                                                 
56 Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of 
Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 2 (2007) 
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the minimum.57  In Table 1, Luxembourg has the sparsest law of them all, with a 
dominance score of two.  It is followed by Belgium and Ireland with Dominance Law 
Scores of four. 
 
There appears to be a correlation between the dominance score and the share of imports 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  The country with the lowest dominance score, 
Luxembourg, also has the highest share of imports in GDP (113 percent).  The country 
with the next lowest dominance score, Belgium, also has a relatively high import share 
(73 percent).  Countries with relatively low import shares have relatively high dominance 
scores.  The strength of a country’s laws on monopolization seems to increase as the 
share of trade in GDP declines.  Put another way, as a country becomes more dependent 






















                                                 
57  The scores were compiled by reading the competition law statutes for each country and, where 
necessary, supplementing the information from case law or other legal reports.  For the underlying data, see 
Keith N. Hylton et al., Antitrust World Reports, available at http://antitrustworldwiki.com.  The 
Dominance Law Score is the sums up the totals for the dominance portion of each country’s template, and 
then adds the score for predatory pricing, see id., Predatory Pricing Report, Antitrust World Reports, 
available at http://antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Predatory_Pricing_Report.  An earlier 
version of the data used in this paper are examined in Keith N. Hylton and Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the 
World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 Antitrust L.J. 2 
(2007).  The scoring approach used is based on the approach in Michael Nicholson, "Quantifying Antitrust 
Regimes" (February 5, 2004). FTC Bureau of Economics Working Papers No. 267. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=531124 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.531124.  The Dominance Score reported in Table 1 
is a broad measure of monopolization law on the books.  It makes no attempt to capture enforcement zeal.  
Of course, enforcement zeal may be positively correlated with the amount of law on the books.  It would 
clearly be desirable to develop a more finely-grained measure of the scope of the law.  That is a problem to 
address in the future.  
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Country Dominance Score 2003 Imports/GDP 
Austria 5 44.81 
Belgium 4 76.60 
Germany 6 31.67 
Denmark 6 38.97 
Spain 6 28.60 
Finland 6 30.71 
France 5 24.55 
Greece 6 29.19 
Ireland 4 67.64 
Italy 6 24.00 
Luxembourg 2 113.31 
Netherlands 5 56.32 
Portugal 6 34.82 
Sweden 5 36.91 
United Kingdom 7 28.32 
United States 5 14.16 
   




Before offering any hypotheses to explain the correlation in Table 1, we should note that 
the laws of the individual EU member countries are to some extent preempted by the 
Article 82 of the EC treaty.  The relationship between national laws and EC law is as 
follows.  For those matters that do not involve commerce among the several EC member 
states (i.e., intra-state, small business matters) the laws of the individual states govern.58  
For those matters that involve commerce among the EC member states, Article 82 
governs.59  However, Article 82 provides a floor and not a ceiling on monopolization 
laws.  Individual member states are permitted to go beyond Article 82 in prohibiting 
conduct not prohibited by Article 82 (e.g., price cuts when price is above average cost) 
and in specifying penalties.60  But even in this instance, the individual nation laws may be 
of interest as a signal of the individual nation’s own priorities with respect to 
                                                 
58 See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room—Why Must the 
Central European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23 BROOKLYN J. INTL L. 
351, 354 (1997). 
59 See, e.g., Wouter P.J. Wils, The Modernization of the Enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis of the Commission’s Proposal for a New Council Regulation Replacing Regulation No. 
17, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1655, 1656 (2001). 
60 See, e.g., William M. Hannay, Transnational Competition Law Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions, 20 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 287, 291 (2000). 
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enforcement.  For these reasons it is worthwhile to examine the variation in the 
dominance laws of various nations.61 
 
B. Demand Versus Supply Side Theories of Dominance Law 
 
The roughly inverse correlation between the strength of dominance law, as reflected in 
national statutes, and the share of trade in GDP could reflect pressures from the supply 
side or from the demand side of the legislative process.  Consider the demand side.  The 
demand-side victims of monopolization are domestic consumers and domestic producers 
operating downstream from a monopolist.  In a trade-dependent economy, the potential 
victims of monopolization may not find a need for a statute constraining the conduct of 
dominant domestic firms, because those firms are already disciplined by the traded goods 
sector.  If the dominant domestic firms were to attempt to raise their prices to monopoly 
levels, they would invite importing firms to invade their customer bases.  Given this type 
of limit-pricing equilibrium, domestic pressure groups consisting of potential demand-
side victims of monopolization would see little need in pressuring the legislature to enact 
a statute constraining dominant firms. 
 
Supply side pressure, or the lack of it, provides an alternative explanation for the inverse 
correlation between trade and the strength of dominant firm law.  The supply-side victims 
of firms that monopolize are direct competitors who are frozen out of markets as a result 
of the conduct of dominant firms.  These potential victims always have an interest in 
some level of protection from competition.  Put another way, whether the national 
economy is trade dependent or not, every domestic firm that perceives itself to be the 
potential victim of exclusionary conduct by a dominant firm has an interest in legislation 
that offers protection from such conduct.62  
 
However, even if a firm has an interest in legislation that protects it from aggressive 
competitive conduct, the costs of securing such legislation may exceed the benefits to the 
firm.  The pressure group formed of these firms may be unable to overcome opposition or 
indifference from other legislative coalitions.  This is a plausible scenario in a trade-
dependent state.  As a result, the inverse correlation between trade dependency and 
monopolization law may reflect a lack of effort on the supply side – i.e., on the part of 
domestic firms – in securing protective legislation. 
 
Indeed, the (supply side) relationship between the scope of dominance law and the level 
of trade may be nonlinear.  Starting from a base level of trade (measured by imports as 
percent of the domestic economy), domestic firms may first push for more dominance 
law to protect them from competition as trade increases.  Suppose, as seems plausible, 
that competitive pressure from importers comes initially from dominant foreign firms.  
                                                 
61 If we examined Article 82 rather than the national competition laws, there would be no variation in the 
dominance laws of the EU.  The national laws offer a sample with some variation that still reflects 
harmonization pressures created by membership in the EU. 
62 One exception to this might be observed when the domestic firms are roughly equal in ability to inflict 
competitive harm on one another and view such harms as live-and-let-live nuisances.  However, this is 
unlikely to be observed. 
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That pressure is likely to cause domestic dominant firms to compete more aggressively.  
During this period of intensifying competition from dominant foreign firms, domestic 
firms will have a strong incentive to seek protection through the enactment of a 
dominance law.  Over time, trade may reach a level at which the costs of seeking more 
protection from dominance law exceed the benefits.  The reason for this turnaround is 
that as the market becomes less concentrated and more intensively competitive as a result 
of trade, seeking a more expansive dominance law would do little to protect a domestic 
firm from competition.  As the market becomes less concentrated, fewer firms operating 
in the market would be constrained by dominance law.   
 
Under this theory, the relationship between trade and the net benefit to domestic firms 
from dominance law would have an inverted U shape.  Assuming the relationship 
between trade and the net benefit to domestic firms also applies to dominance law itself, 






   Figure 1: Inverted U Relationship between Dominance Law and Trade 
 
 
Determining whether the demand-side or supply-side explanation of monopoly 
legislation is valid is an empirical project.  However, legislation is understood today as 
the product of concentrated rather than diffuse interest groups.  The demand-side theory – 
that the inverse correlation between the strength of monopoly law and trade dependency 
is due to a lack of demand from consumers – posits the existence of pressure from diffuse 
interest groups.  The supply theory, on the other hand, explains observed legislation as a 
function of the strength or weakness of concentrated interest groups.  The supply-side 
theory has the advantage of being consistent with modern explanations of legislation. 
 







In this part we use a regression model to explore the importance of supply and demand 
side explanations of the determination of dominance law.  Treating the Dominance Law 
Score as the dependent variable, we estimated an equation of the following form: 
 
       Dominance Law = α + β1GDP + β2GDPcap + β3Imports/GDP + β4Agriculture 
 
                                    + β5Education + β6Elder + β7GovSpend + β8LegalOrigin (1) 
 
 
1. Variables and Hypotheses 
 
GDP is gross domestic product, and GDPcap is gross domestic product per capita.  The 
variable Imports is a measure of imports as a percent of GDP.  Agriculture is the 
percentage of the workforce in the agricultural sector.  Education is measured as the ratio 
of secondary school enrollment to the secondary school-aged population.  Elder is the 
percentage of the population aged 65 and over.63  Govspend is a measure of government 
spending as a percentage of GDP.  LegalOrigin is a dummy variable identifying the legal 
origin of the country. 
 
The key variable in this analysis is the measure of imports relative to GDP 
(Imports/GDP).  As the previous discussion implies, a negative coefficient estimate is 
consistent with both demand and supply side theories of the production of dominance 
law.  In other words, a negative coefficient is consistent with a regime in which 
consumers are the major interest group pushing for dominance law (demand side), and 
also consistent with a regime in which producers are pushing for such laws (supply side), 
but are unable to enact them because of indifference from other factions. 
 
A positive estimate for the imports variable coefficient would be inconsistent with the 
demand side theory.  As imports increase relative to GDP, consumers should perceive 
less need to seek legislation protecting them from monopoly abuses.  However, a positive 
estimate for the imports variable would not be inconsistent with the supply side theory.  
Even if imports are high relative to GDP, some producers will still desire protection from 
aggressively competitive conduct by dominant firms.  Indeed, the desire for such 
protection may be stronger when import penetration is high, because competition from 
both foreign and domestic firms would be more intense. 
 
Although Imports/GDP is the key variable of concern, some of the other variables could 
mimic its effect, by having both supply and demand side influences on the production of 
dominance law.  This complicates any effort to predict the signs of the coefficients in the 
                                                 
63 All of the explanatory variables used in this paper are from the World Bank data base except for two. 
First, Imports/GDP is missing for the U.S. in 2004 in the World Bank’s data. The number we used is based 
on the data from the Economic Report of the President, 2005, available at 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables05.html.  Second, for the U.S., the data on Education were taken from 
the 2007 statistical abstract from the census bureau, available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/labor_force_employment_earnings/labor_force_status/. 
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regression equation.  On the other hand, each estimated coefficient sheds light on the 
competing theories of the transmission effect of that variable.  Rather than attempt to 
predict the coefficient signs, we will discuss transmission-effect theories here. 
 
We controlled for gross domestic product (GDP) on the theory that larger economies will 
differ in significant respects from smaller ones.  There are potentially conflicting effects 
of economy size on the dominance score.  Larger economies will be less dependent on 
imports to dampen the market power of domestic firms.  This suggests that GDP will 
have the same impact as the imports variable, though weaker.  On the other hand, sectoral 
composition affects the scope of monopolization law: antitrust laws were first enacted in 
industrialized economies.64  The sectoral composition effect implies the scope of 
monopolization law will be greater in larger economies. 
 
Per capita GDP (GDPcap) is included as an explanatory variable for the obvious reason 
that wealthier countries should be willing to spend more, other things being equal, on 
their regulatory preferences.  Specifically, if monopolization law is a response to public 
preferences for protection from monopolistic pricing, then wealthier economies should be 
willing to spend more on such protection.  On the other hand, wealthier economies are 
associated with larger markets for goods and services, and this suggests that wealth could 
mimic the effect of the imports variable. 
 
We controlled for the workforce in agriculture (Agriculture) on the theory that dominance 
law is less likely to be observed as that share increases.  Historically, the first antitrust 
laws in the world were enacted in the U.S. and Canada (relatively advanced economies) 
as a consequence of the power of the railroads and trusts.65  Agricultural economies are 
not typically associated with the concerns that led to the first antitrust statutes. 
 
However, our sample consists of the U.S. and European countries, and there are no 
primarily agricultural economies in this group.  The percentage of the workforce in 
agriculture may capture something other than sectoral composition within our sample.  
For example, within a sample of wealthy countries, the percentage of the workforce in 
agriculture could capture the strength of farm lobbies rather than the effect of sectoral 
structure. 
 
We controlled for education (Education) because it should be easier for legislators to 
persuade a more educated population of the dangers from monopolization.  The first 
antitrust laws in the world were enacted in the U.S. and Canada following widespread 
press reports critical of the conduct of the railroads and the trusts.66  This implies that 
dominance law’s scope should be greater in more educated countries. 
 
The variable measuring the percentage of elderly (Elder) is an attempt to get at the degree 
of risk aversion in the population.  Older workers and business owners probably would 
perceive a stronger need to be protected from business losses that might result from 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 13, at 37-39. 
65 HYLTON, supra note 13, at 37-39. 
66 Id. 
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aggressive competition.  This would lead to a greater scope of dominance law as the 
percentage of elderly increases. 
 
The amount of government spending relative to GDP (Govspend) is relevant to the 
production of dominance law because an economy dominated by the government will 
probably generate fewer demands for protection from dominant firms.  Such firms are 
likely to be under considerable government regulation already.  In addition, the 
government itself may be less willing to effectively surrender some of its power to 
consumers directly (as in the case of the Clayton Act, which permits private lawsuits) or 
to special government agencies.67  This the scope of dominance law will decline as the 
share of government spending in the economy increases. 
 
The final set of regressors control for the legal origin of the country.68  Legal origin is 
treated as indicator of the inclination toward market regulation, on the assumption that 
countries with similar legal origins are more likely to take similar approaches to 
competition law.  We control for English, Scandinavian, Socialist, French, and German 
legal origins. 
 
2. Regression Approaches 
 
In theory, equation (1) would describe the relationship between a continuous dominance 
law variable and several explanatory variables.  In fact, we have a discrete dependent 
variable that measures categories in which a country’s dominance law falls.  Technically, 
ordered probit is the preferred regression method given our data. 
  
The dominance score ranges from 1 to 7. As the difference between the score of 2 and 3 
may not be the same as that between 3 an 4 (and so on) due to the coding of the statute, it 
is important to examine the determinants of dominance law using an ordered probit 
model. Suppose that latent variable depends on a vector of observable characteristics as 
we used in the above OLS regressions, 
 
ititit Xy  
'*  , 
 
where it  follows standard normal distribution.  We observe only the dominance score y 
but not the latent variable *y  where 
 
1y   if * 1y   
y j  if *1j jy     
y J  if * 1Jy    
 
                                                 
67 See Franz Kronthaler & Johannes Stephan, Factors Accounting for the Enactment of a Competition Law 
– An Empirical Analysis, 52 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 137, 147 (2007). 
68 La Porta et al, The Quality of Government, 15 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 222 (1999). 
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We set J equal to 5 in our analysis. Given in our sample, the frequency of having 
dominance no bigger than 3 is small, we combine and set up y = 1 for dominance scores 
equal to 1 or 2 and y = 2 for dominance scores equal to 3 or 4. As a result, we have 5 
individual categories with 4 thresholds. The model is estimated using the maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure. Again because observations of each individual country 
may be correlated to each other, the estimation is clustered at the country level. 
 
Given the estimation of the parameters and the thresholds, the probability of having a 
dominance score equal to j could be calculated as follows, 
 
*
1 1Pr( 1| ) Pr( | ) ( )y X y X X         
*
1 1Pr( | ) Pr( | ) ( ) ( )j j j jy j X y X X X              
*
1 1Pr( | ) Pr( | ) 1 ( )J Jy J X y X X          
 
The interpretation of the parameters is not as straightforward as those parameters are of 
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where ( )  is the probability density function for normal. Note here that the marginal 
effect will change as the underlying values of X changes. 
 
An alternative model to consider is the fixed effects framework 
 
itiitit Xy  
'*  , 
 
where i  is a time-invariant effect on the scope of dominance law in each country.  
Although we have attempted to control for time-invariant effects (e.g., LegalOrigin), if 
the variables incorporated in X do not effectively control for such effects the fixed effects 
estimator would be preferable to the ordinary least squares approach. 
 
The greatest drawback with the fixed effects estimator is that our data are not well suited 
for it.  Estimation in the fixed effects model requires temporal variation in y and X, but 
our dominance law measure y is relatively stable.  The dominance score changes in very 
few countries over the time period of our sample.  Still, we present the fixed effects 




3. Ordered Probit and Least Squares Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of ordered probit and ordinary least squares regression 
of equation (1) for the European Union member countries and the U.S.  We have decided 
to present both ordinary least squares and ordered probit results because the greater ease 
of interpreting the least squares results. 
 
For the period of the sample (2000 to 2004 inclusive) the EU consisted of 15 members: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  During 
this period, ten countries were waiting to join the EU: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Because of missing 
observations, Cyprus had to be dropped from the sample. 
 
The first two columns of Tables 2 and 3 present results for the EU15 and the U.S.  The 
last three columns present results for the EU25 (excluding Cyprus) and the U.S.  Both 
GDP and GDP per capita are logged in the regressions. 
 
a. Imports  
 
The imports (relative to GDP) measure is statistically significant in most of the columns 
in both Tables 2 and 3.  In general, the imports estimate suggests that trade dependency is 
negatively related to the scope of dominance law – put simply, more trade dependent 
states have less dominance law.  But this general impression weakens as more variables 
controlling for heterogeneity are included in the regression.  The imports variable loses 
statistical significance in the in the EU15 regression that includes the legal origin 
variables.  It also loses significance in the last regression, and changes slope when 
interacted with a dummy variable representing non-EU countries (i.e., the ten countries 
waiting to join the EU during the sample period). 
 
The first and third columns, which drop the legal origin variables, permit one to see how 
much the estimated import effect changes as additional variables controlling for 
heterogeneity are added.  In general, the imports measure doubles in impact when the 
legal origin variables are excluded. 
 
These results suggest that the apparent negative relationship between imports and the 
scope of dominance law is not as strong as suggested by Table 1.  As more variables 
controlling for heterogeneity among the countries are included in the regression, the 
relationship between dominance law and imports weakens substantially. 
 
The last column of Table 2 further undermines the implied negative relationship of Table 
1 (comparing dominance law scores and import percentages).  Here we include an 
interaction between imports and non-EU status.  The slope of the imports variable is 
positive in this column for the non-EU countries. 
 
b. Other Variables 
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The U.S dummy variable is negative and statistically significant in the EU25 sample and 
not in the EU15 sample.  This suggests that the U.S. is not more conservative than the 
core EU members, if judged on the basis of the scope of statutory law.  However, the 
U.S. is more conservative than the enlarged EU.  Thus, even after controlling for 
variables affecting the scope of the law, dominance law in the U.S. appears to be more 
conservative (or less interventionist) than that in Europe.  In light of our earlier 
discussion of monopolization doctrine, these results probably understate the degree to 
which U.S. monopolization law is more conservative than the laws of the EU members.  
First, the laws of the individual nations, which were used in the regression analysis, are 
not more expansive and some are less expansive than EU law.  It follows that if the U.S. 
appears to be conservative in comparison to the laws of the individual EU member states, 
it is even more conservative in comparison to EU law.  Second, our coding of 
monopolization laws fails to incorporate some important details, such as the approach of 
a given regime toward essential facilities cases.69  In this special area of dominance law, 
the U.S. is more conservative than the other nations with competition laws.   
 
Legal origin affects dominance law.  The European countries with a socialist legal 
background have a narrower dominance law than the rest of Europe.  Those with a 
Scandinavian legal background have broader monopolization laws. 
 
There are varying levels of statistical significance observed in the remaining variables.  
Per capita GDP appears to have the greatest effect overall and has a consistently negative 
impact.  This is inconsistent with a view of monopolization law as responsive to public 
preferences.  It is consistent with the prediction that GDP per capita would mimic the 
effect of the imports measure – in the sense that wealthier economies are associated with 
larger more competitively intense economies. 
 
Percent elderly, which we predicted would have a positive impact as a more risk-averse 
population would demand more protection from competition law, has an insignificant 
impact for the most part and a negative and significant impact in one regression.  This 
goes against the view that dominance law responds to the risk preferences of the 
population. 
 
4. Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Regressions 
 
The ordered probit model permits us to examine marginal effects for each of the 
explanatory variables and for each category of dominance law.  Recall that the ordered 
probit model assumes 5 categories: category one consists if dominance law scores 1 and 
2; category 2 consists of dominance law scores 3 and 4; categories 3, 4, and 5 consist of 
dominance scores 5, 6, and 7 respectively. 
 
                                                 
69 However, we have incorporate information on predatory pricing laws in the dominance measure used for 
the regressions.  This should limit the degree to which the dominance measure understates the gap between 
U.S. law and that of EU member states. 
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Table 4 presents marginal effects from the ordered probit regressions.  We used the third 
regression of Table 3 to calculate marginal effects. 
 
The marginal effects for the U.S. show that an increase Imports/GDP increases the 
likelihood of being in the low dominance score ranges of 1 through 4.  Increasing imports 
reduces the likelihood of being in dominance score range of 5, 6, and 7.  For the EU, an 
increase in imports increases the likelihood of being in the dominance score range of 1 
through 5, and reduces the likelihood of being at the highest levels of 6 and 7. 
 
The marginal effects for the both the U.S. and the EU are consistent with the inverted U 
hypothesis.  They suggest that the point at which the benefits provided to domestic firms 
from monopolization law declines earlier in the U.S. than in Europe. 
 
5. OLS again 
 
The relationship between imports and dominance law is more complicated than the 
negative correlation observed in Table 1.  Table 2 shows that when controlling for 
heterogeneity both in the sample (column 2 of Table 2) and in the slop of the imports 
variable (column 5 of Table 2), the negative relationship fails to hold.  One explanation 
for this failure is provided by the marginal effects from the ordered probit model.  The 
marginal effects suggest that the imports variable has an inverted U relationship with the 
dominance law measure. 
 
In this part, we use ordinary least squares for an alternative test of the inverted U 
hypothesis.  Specifically, Table 5 presents results in which the imports and the square of 
imports are included as regressors.  Moreover, we have divided the variable into two 
categories depending on the scale of imports.  The slope for the imports variable is 
allowed to differ for countries with imports less than 50 percent of GDP 
(Imports/GDP*Small), and for countries with imports greater than 50 percent of GDP 
(Imports/GDP*Big). 
 
The reason for suspecting a nonlinear relationship is that domestic firms may initially 
seek additional protection from competition as imports enter the domestic market.  
However, at some point the marginal benefits of protection fall below the marginal cost, 
after which imports no longer generate a greater push by domestic firms for legal 
protection. 
 
We have divided countries according to the level of imports on the theory that the 
baseline relationship between imports and dominance law should differ between large 
economies and small dependent economies.  In a small dependent economy, the baseline 
level of imports (measured when dominance law is at a minimal level) will be large as a 
percentage of GDP.  For a large economy, the baseline level of imports will be relatively 
small.  If, as we have hypothesized, an inverted U shape explains the relationship 
between imports and dominance law within both sets of countries, a regression that failed 
to separate the two groups would confuse the nonlinear relationships observed in both 
sets of countries. 
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The results of Table 5 are consistent with the nonlinear relationship theory.  For both 
small import and trade-dependent economies, one observes a statistically significant, 
inverted U shaped relationship between imports and dominance law.  The cross-over 
points for the large (small import) economies occur at 36.5 percent and 31.2 percent in 
the first and second columns respectively.  For trade-dependent (big import) economies, 
the cross-over points occur at 53.5 and 51 percent. 
 
6. Fixed Effects Regressions 
 
Because of the small number of changes in the dominance law variable, our sample is not 
well suited for the fixed effects framework.  We ran the fixed effects model anyway to 
examine its implications.  Table 6 presents fixed effects regressions, both with the EU15 
sample and the EU25 sample.  The most noticeable difference is that the imports variable 
has a statistically significant and positive coefficient in the fixed effects regressions. 
 
However, the relatively small number of changes in the dominance law variable over the 
period of the sample provides a strong reason to discount the fixed effects results.  The 
countries that experienced changes in the dominance law scope are Czech Republic, 
Ireland, Luxembourg (two changes over the sample period), and Slovak Republic.  Each 
of these countries is a relatively small, trade-dependent economy (imports as a percent of 
GDP exceeds 50 percent in each country).  These results provide additional support to the 
inverted U hypothesis. 
 
Moreover, since two of the four countries in the group with changes are in the non-EU 
subsample, the positive estimate in the fixed effects regression confirms the finding of the 





We have distinguished supply and demand side theories of dominance law and attempted 
to find evidence for these theories in the regression results.  Under a demand side theory, 
dominance law is produced in response to demands for protection from monopolistic 
pricing.  Under a supply side theory, dominance law is produced in response to demands 
by domestic firms for protection from the aggressive competitive conduct of dominant 
firms. 
 
Both demand and supply-side theories are consistent with the observed negative 
correlation between the scope of dominance law and the level of import penetration.  
However, we argue that only the supply-side theory is consistent with a positive 
relationship between import penetration and the scope of dominance law. 
 
The regression evidence supports neither theory as a general account of the process by 
which dominance law is generated in the wealthiest economies.  The regression evidence 
is consistent with a third theory advanced here, of an inverted U relationship between 
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import penetration and the scope of dominance law.  Under the nonlinear relationship 
theory, dominance law and import penetration are positively related initially, as import 
penetration rises above a baseline initial level.  As import penetration increases, a point is 
reached at which the benefits of legal protection to domestic firms are no longer greater 
than the costs of seeking protection. 
 
Under the nonlinear relationship theory, slope of the imports variable in the dominance 
law regression will depend on the type of country and the level of import penetration.  
Regressions that fail to disaggregate the countries will generate unreliable results.  The 
negative coefficient in the OLS regressions and the positive coefficient in the fixed 
effects regressions are both incorrect as general descriptions of the relationship between 
import penetration and dominance law.  Indeed, the positive result for the fixed effects 
regressions probably reflects the disproportionate share of small dependent countries 
among the countries that experienced changes in the scope of dominance law in the 




This paper is both a survey and an empirical assessment of US and EU monopolization 
law.  The empirical results raise questions about the forces that generate monopolization 
law. 
 
American monopolization law has evolved to be more conservative than European law in 
its present stage.  Roughly since the publication of Areeda and Turner’s article on 
predation, American courts and commentators have shown a concern for potential false 
conviction costs under monopolization law.  This concern has been especially evident in 
predation law (Brooke Group) and the law governing unilateral refusals to deal (Trinko). 
 
Our empirical analysis has focused on the factors that explain broad variations in the 
scope of monopolization law in the U.S. and EU.  One factor of special interest is 
international trade.  Monopolization law appears to have an inverted U relationship with 
import penetration, rising first with import penetration and then falling.  This finding is 
inconsistent with the theory that monopolization law in the most important competition 




Table 2: OLS 
Dependent variable: Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg.5 
Dominance Score   (EU15) (EU15)   (EU25) (EU25)  (EU25) 
       
Independent Coefficient     
variables:  (|t-stat|) 
       
GDP -0.204 0.069 -0.112 0.137 0.529** 
  (0.63) (0.39 ) (0.66) (0.91 ) (2.98 ) 
       
GDP per capita -1.73 -2.893** -0.528** -1.867** -0.943* 
  (1.45) (2.58) (2.30) (5.61) (1.97) 
       
Imports/GDP -0.043** -0.016 -0.043** -0.019** -0.006 
  (4.92) (1.41) (5.38) (2.36) (0.74) 
       
Agriculture -0.15 -0.139 -0.113** -0.085** 0.048 
  (1.01) (1.50) (2.81) (2.86) (0.95 ) 
       
Education -0.008 -0.019 0.000 -0.006 -0.003 
  (1.06) (1.99) (0.00 ) (1.19) (0.67) 
       
Elder -0.149** -0.051 -0.069 -0.015 0.06 
  (2.73) (0.69) (0.88) (0.13) (0.57 ) 
       
Government Spending -0.013 0.017 -0.068** -0.06* -0.051* 
  (0.29) (0.40 ) (2.52) (1.96) (1.89) 
       
US -1.399 -1.219* -1.984** -1.741** -2.367** 
  (1.65) (1.76) (2.97) (2.54) (3.43) 
       
Legal Origin_England  0.713*  0.647 0.76 
   (1.85 )  (1.27 ) (1.55 ) 
       
Legal Origin_French  -0.303  -0.065 -0.096 
   (1.45)  (0.31) (0.42) 
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Legal Origin_Scan  0.954*  1.093** 1.469** 
   (1.95 )  (2.56 ) (3.17 ) 
       
Legal Origin_Socialist    -1.888** -2.517** 
   .  (4.59) (6.65) 
       
Imports/GDP*NEU     0.038** 
      (2.89 ) 
       
Constant 34.393 36.399** 18.594** 23.547** 0.825 
  (1.53 ) (2.43 ) (3.89 ) (6.06 ) (0.09 ) 
       
Rsquared Adjusted 0.712 0.764 0.468 0.602 0.664 
       
N 80 80 125 125 125 
Note: ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1 






Table 3: Ordered Probit 
Dependent variable: Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 Reg.5 
Dominance Score  (EU15)  (EU15)  (EU25)  (EU25)  (EU25) 
       
Independent Coefficient     
variables:  (|t-stat|) 
                    
GDP -1.032* -0.491 -0.118 0.392 1.141** 
  (1.73) (0.87) (0.43) (1.32 ) (2.93 ) 
       
GDP per capita -4.75** -7.204** -0.595* -3.266** -1.842* 
  (2.35) (2.56) (1.77) (3.83) (1.72) 
       
Imports/GDP -0.099** -0.048 -0.058** -0.024 -0.001 
  (3.78) (1.45) (3.87) (1.42) (0.05) 
       
Agriculture -0.538** -0.556** -0.171** -0.154** 0.079 
  (2.09) (2.46) (2.90) (2.44) (0.79 ) 
       
Education -0.052** -0.076** -0.009 -0.03** -0.029** 
  (3.10) (2.93) (0.90) (3.03) (2.98) 
       
Elder -0.221 0.009 -0.081 0.035 0.174 
  (1.54) (0.05 ) (0.62) (0.17 ) (0.89 ) 
       
Government Spending -0.022 -0.022 -0.122** -0.152** -0.14** 
  (0.22) (0.22) (2.44) (2.41) (2.18) 
       
US -1.982 -2.182 -3.488** -4.02** -5.396** 
  (1.16) (1.28) (3.06) (2.73) (3.15) 
       
Legal Origin_England  2.246*  1.712 1.914 
   (1.77 )  (1.36 ) (1.52 ) 
       
Legal Origin_French  0.134  0.432 0.321 
   (0.21 )  (0.86 ) (0.57 ) 
       
Legal Origin_Scan  2.797*  3.023** 3.853** 
   (1.77 )  (3.67 ) (4.08 ) 
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Legal Origin_Socialist    -3.015** -4.577** 
     (2.53) (3.89) 
       
Imports/GDP*NEU     0.07** 
      (2.87 ) 
       
       
Log Likelihood -54.544 -45.871 -117.487 -95.502 -87.897 
       
N 80 80 125 125 125 
      
Note: ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1 
Table 3: Ordered Probit regression, with year dummies, standard errors are 
clustered at country level 
 
 






Table 4: Marginal Effects of the Explanatory Variables on Dominance Score 
 
United States      
Dominance Score GDP  
     GDP per  
        capita 
Imports/GDP
Government 
  Spending  
1,2 0.386% 1.945% 0.191% 0.399%  
3,4 3.745% 18.892% 1.851% 3.879%  
5 -0.655% -3.307% -0.324% -0.679%  
6 -3.448% -17.393% -1.704% -3.571%  
7 -0.027% -0.137% -0.013% -0.028%  
      
Europe      
Dominance Score GDP  
  GDP per 
   capita 
Imports/GDP
Government 
 Spending  
1,2 0.065% 0.329% 0.032% 0.067%  
3,4 2.225% 11.226% 1.100% 2.305%  
5 2.399% 12.101% 1.185% 2.484%  
6 -4.494% -22.671% -2.221% -4.655%  
7 -0.195% -0.985% -0.096% -0.202%  
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Table 5: OLS 
Dependent variable: Reg. 1 Reg. 2 
Dominance Score     
    
Independent Coefficient  
variables:  (|t-stat|) 
    
Imports/GDP*Big 0.107* 0.102* 
  (1.98 ) (1.95 ) 
    
Imports/GDP*Big2 -0.001* -0.001** 
  (1.96) (2.03) 
    
Imports/GDP*Small 0.292** 0.312** 
  (2.45 ) (2.71 ) 
    
Imports/GDP*Small2 -0.004** -0.005** 
  (2.41) (2.86) 
    
GDP 0.186 -0.012 
  (1.47 ) (0.14) 
    
GDP per capita -0.963** -1.168** 
  (3.19) (4.08) 
    
Agriculture -0.044 -0.079** 
  (1.60) (4.25) 
    
Education -0.009 -0.006 
  (1.31) (1.02) 
    
Elder 0.055 -0.006 
  (0.83 ) (0.11) 
    
Government Spending -0.05** -0.047** 
  (2.94) (2.66) 
    
US -0.091 0.163 
  (0.12) (0.22 ) 
 30
    
NEU 1.332**               
  (2.19 )               
    
Legal Origin_England 0.835** 0.618** 
  (2.51 ) (1.99 ) 
    
Legal Origin_French 0.210 0.100 
  (0.78 ) (0.39 ) 
    
Legal Origin_Scan 0.994** 0.55* 
  (2.25 ) (1.66 ) 
    
Legal Origin_Socialist -1.54** -0.872** 
  (3.19) (2.03) 
    
Constant 6.312 14.711** 
  (0.99 ) (3.40 ) 
    
Rsquared Adjusted 0.659 0.644 
    
N 125 125 
   
Note: ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1  




           Table 6: Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3 Reg. 4 
Dominance Score  (EU15)  (EU15) (EU25) (EU25)  
      
Independent Coefficient    
variables:  (|t-stat|)    
      
GDP 7.235 2.952 3.82 6.03 
  (0.82 ) (0.41 ) (0.63 ) (1.15 ) 
      
GDP per capita 1.057 3.727 -2.19 -3.921 
  (0.13 ) (0.48 ) (0.43) (0.87) 
      
Imports/GDP 0.069** 0.067** 0.044** 0.045** 
  (2.74 ) (2.67 ) (3.35 ) (3.38 ) 
      
Agriculture 0.279 0.24 0.083 0.088 
  (1.58 ) (1.41 ) (0.82 ) (0.87 ) 
      
Education 0.008 0.01 0.007 0.005 
  (0.99 ) (1.20 ) (1.02 ) (0.87 ) 
      
Elder 0.274  -0.159  
  (0.84 )  (0.72)  
      
Government Spending 0.245* 0.182 0.137 0.166* 
  (1.70 ) (1.48 ) (1.45 ) (1.97 ) 
      
R-squared:     
Within 0.224 0.214 0.182 0.178 
Between 0.159 0.001 0.094 0.124 
Overall  0.144 0.000 0.085 0.111 
      
N 80 80 125 125 
Note: ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1 






I. Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Agriculture: Employment in agriculture (% of total employment):  
   
Education: The ratio of secondary school enrollment to the secondary school-aged 
population. 
   
Elder: Percentage of total population ages 65 and above. 
 
Government spending: The ratio of general government final consumption expended to 
GDP. 
 
Legal Origin:  
 
 
Legal Origin Country  
England  Cyprus, Ireland, United Kingdom, United States 
French 
Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Portugal 
Germany Austria, Germany 
Scan Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
Socialist 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
 
 
Sources: All of the explanatory variables used in this paper are from the World Bank - 
World Development Indicators except for the following cases 
 
1. Imports/GDP is missing for the United States at 2004. This number was calculated 
based on the data from economic report of the president, 2005.  
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/tables05.html 
 
2. Employment in Agriculture for France is obtained from the CIA World Factbook. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html 
(CIA provides data for the year of 1999.) 
 
 
II. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dominance Score 5.29 1.16 1 7 
GDP (log) 26.60 1.47 23.70 30.01 
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GDP per capita (log) 10.05 0.37 9.26 10.83 
Imports/GDP 45.05 26.98 13.73 129.01 
Agriculture 4.91 3.90 1.30 17.40 
Government spending 20.24 3.69 13.96 28.32 
Education 110.99 16.86 89.48 160.15 
Elder 15.66 2.04 10.93 19.67 
N=80     
 
 
Variable Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dominance Score 5.21 1.07 1 7 
GDP (log) 25.57 1.93 22.06 30.01 
GDP per capita (log) 9.53 0.79 8.09 10.83 
Imports/GDP 52.20 25.50 13.73 129.01 
Agriculture 6.55 5.12 1.30 19.30 
Government spending 19.89 3.58 10.19 28.32 
Education 105.99 15.45 86.58 160.15 
Elder 15.09 2.00 10.93 19.67 
N=125  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
